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Abstract
It is widely believed that theory is useful in physics because it describes simple systems and
that strictly empirical phenomenological approaches are necessary for complex biological and so-
cial systems. Here we prove based upon an analysis of the information that can be obtained from
experimental observations that theory is even more essential in the understanding of complex sys-
tems. Implications of this proof revise the general understanding of how we can understand complex
systems including the behaviorist approach to human behavior, problems with testing engineered
systems, and medical experimentation for evaluating treatments and the FDA approval of medi-
cations. Each of these approaches are inherently limited in their ability to characterize real world
systems due to the large number of conditions that can affect their behavior. Models are necessary
as they can help to characterize behavior without requiring observations for all possible conditions.
The testing of models by empirical observations enhances the utility of those observations. For
systems for which adequate models have not been developed, or are not practical, the limitations
of empirical testing lead to uncertainty in our knowledge and risks in individual, organizational
and social policy decisions. These risks should be recognized and inform our decisions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The scientific method is often a subject of discussion [1, 2] and pedagogy [3–5]. Here
we formalize and quantify the discussion of scientific method itself by applying information
theory [6] to analyze the process of observation and description. The subject of our analysis
will be a set of strictly defined empirical approaches. We include in this category classical
behaviorism [7–9] and modern medical double-blind experiments [10–12]. These approaches
adopt a specific relationship between observations, description and inference that are char-
acterized by self-imposed limitations on the type of observations that are possible, and the
relationship of experiment and theory. We show that when these limitations are imposed, the
number of observations needed grows exponentially in the amount of information required
to describe the conditions affecting the system. For any system that has more than a few
possible conditions, the amount of information needed to describe it is not communicable
in any reasonable time or writable on any reasonable medium. This result constrains the
possible advances in knowledge.
Our analysis is in the sprit of computational complexity theory in that it focuses on the
scaling of the problem with its difficulty (complexity). We show that the scaling of a strictly
empirical approach is exponential. Such exponential problems are impossible for all but the
simplest problems, and alternative approaches must be identified. Our analysis may be con-
sidered to be an impossibility theorem, like the Halting problem or Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorems, in the context of epistemology—the study of the nature of knowledge. However,
our framing also provides insight about how progress can and even must be made.
The analysis provides a guide to improving the process of medication approval, and the
study of human psychology. Specifically, it shows that theoretical models are necessary for
the characterization of complex systems. We also point to parallel insights for engineering,
specifically the validation and testing of engineered systems—a significant practical concern.
While the scaling limits of empirical approaches can be addressed by incorporating theory,
the ability to empirically validate theory remains limited and where adequate theories have
not been developed uncertainty translates into decision-making risks whose existence have
far reaching implications.
A key contribution of our work is the unification of these various seemingly disparate
issues within a single mathematical and conceptual framework through information analysis.
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Ashby has promoted the use of models as a practical matter pointing out the limitation of
individuals in processing data [13]; it is likely that he recognized that the same limitation
applies to the processing of information by society and therefore to scientific analysis itself,
which is the focus of our analysis.
Brief discussions of our analysis have been given previously [14–16], as well as its im-
plications for innovation and engineering of complex systems where failures that may be
associated with the inability to test systems are common [16]. Recently this issue has been
pointed to in the context of engineering of biological systems in regard to the risks associated
with genetically modified organisms (GMOs) [17].
II. ANALYSIS
In order to frame the discussion of scientific methodology we consider a set of individual
agents (scientists) that are independently observing the behavior of a system. Progress
is made when one scientist making observations communicates these observations to the
other scientists. The subject of our analysis is the length of the message that provides
a complete description of the system. (The number of scientists is not important to our
analysis as even a single scientist must record findings, and the resulting record is the
subject of our analysis.) We will analyze this message length for an assumed methodology
of scientific inquiry. The scientists adopt a methodology that consists of determining the
action (outcome, dependent variables) of the system in response to a mutually agreed upon
set of conditions (see Fig. 1). The set of conditions can include environmental conditions
as well as internal conditions, whether controllable or uncontrollable—treatments, inputs,
circumstances—constituting the combined set of values of all independent variables. This
definition is consistent with the methodology of phenomenological approaches, including
behaviorism and medical drug testing.
In an analysis based upon information theory [6] we identify the minimum amount of in-
formation necessary to communicate a full description of the system based upon the number
of such descriptions that are possible. Thus if there are N possible messages, the minimum
amount of information that is needed is I = log2(N) bits of information. This is required be-
cause each possible message must have a distinct representation and the number of possible
messages with I bits is 2I . Messages might wastefully use more than this number of bits but
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FIG. 1: In describing the behavior of a system using a strictly empirical phenomenological
approach, we observe a system as it responds (Action) to a set of external and internal conditions
(Conditions). The number of possible responses is NA = 2
IA actions, where IA is the information
needed to specify which action occured. The number of distinct conditions is NC = 2
IC , where
IC is the information necessary to specify the condition. Observers of the system can provide a
behavioral description of the system by providing IS = IA2
IC bits of information. Exponential
growth of this information with IC implies such behavioral descriptions are impractical for all but
small values of IC , i.e. for a very limited set of conditions.
this is the minimum message length that enables a unique message and thus unambiguous
communication.
In order to facilitate the communication between scientists engaged in studies of a par-
ticular system, we assume they jointly act in a specific way to minimize the amount of
information that must be communicated. First, the scientists determine in advance the set
of conditions that are to be characterized and assign a distinct numerical label for each of
them. Thus, the only information that must be communicated by a scientist performing a
single observation is the numerical label of the condition. The amount of information neces-
sary in order to specify the condition being observed is only IC = log2(NC). Communicating
the result of the observation consists of identifying the action that resulted from that con-
dition. Similar to the conditions, the set of actions of interest are identified in advance and
are labeled numerically for identification. The amount of information necessary to specify
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the action is IA = log2(NA). Communicating a single observation requires at least IC + IA
bits of information that specify in sequence which condition is being observed, and which
action is found for that environment.
The primary object of our analysis is a complete description of the behavior of the
system—a list of which action arises for each of the possible environmental conditions. The
amount of information necessary to provide this description is given by:
IS = 2
ICIA (1)
This result follows from noting that for a complete description we need to specify an ob-
servation for each environmental condition of which there are NC = 2
IC . This has to be
multiplied by the amount of information necessary to communicate which action occurs,
IA. It might seem that each observation must be accompanied also by a specification of the
environment. However, we can abbreviate a complete description by recognizing that it is
not necessary to communicate which environment is being observed, it is only necessary to
order the actions observed in a pre-specified sequence. The action of the system in response
to the first condition is listed first, the second second, and so on. The list has NC members,
with each member of the list having IA bits of information. The total number of bits in the
list is therefore given by Eq. (1). Note that the analysis can be extended for probabilistic
outcomes by taking the description of the action to consist of a set of probabilities at a
desired precision. Note also that we do not include the information needed to specify the
correspondence of labels to the real world nature of the conditions or actions.
Eq. (1) can be stated as a rigorous “behavioral complexity” theorem determining the
information in a description of a system’s response: Given a set of conditions NC and a
set of possible responses NA, the amount of information necessary to describe the behavior
of a system is given by Eq. (1), with IC and IA defined as before. This theorem is well
known as the amount of information to characterize a boolean function that produces IA
bits from IC input bits, the size of its truth table [18]. Our interest is in using this result
to analyze the limitations of scientific characterization and methodology. The importance
of Eq. (1) for scientific methodology resides primarily in the rapid growth of the amount
of information with IC . In the following, we illustrate this as a problem in specific well
accepted methodologies.
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III. DISCUSSION
The mathematical discussion of behavioral complexity has direct implications for our
understanding of scientific inquiry. Strictly empirical approaches that self-limit the nature
of inquiry can be directly mapped onto the mathematical formulation of the theorem.
Consider behaviorism. Behaviorism, as defined in the early 20th century is the description
of behavior without reference to the internal functioning of the brain. Instead, as epitomized
by Pavlov’s research on dogs [7] and Skinner’s box [8], the organism (human or animal)
is presented with a specified set of environmental conditions. The response to each of
these environmental conditions is measured. This set of responses then is considered to
characterize the behavior of the system. Of key importance to our application of the theorem
to this scientific approach is its self-imposed exclusion of considering the internal functioning
of the system. The traditional experiments that were used to establish the discussion of
behaviorism were limited to very few environmental conditions. For example, for Pavlov’s
experiments measuring the conditioned reflex of dog salivation to bell ringing, resulting from
prior bell ringing when eating food, an enumeration of conditions is:
• no prior bell ringing with food, no bell ringing, no food present,
• no prior bell ringing with food, no bell ringing, food present,
• no prior bell ringing with food, bell ringing, no food present,
• no prior bell ringing with food, bell ringing, food present,
• prior bell ringing with food, no bell ringing, no food present,
• prior bell ringing with food, no bell ringing, food present,
• prior bell ringing with food, bell ringing, no food present, and
• prior bell ringing with food, bell ringing, food present.
The possible responses were
• salivating, and
• not salivating.
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Similarly only a few conditions were present in Skinner’s box—indeed the whole point of
having a “box” is to restrict severely the set of possible environmental conditions. Difficulties
arise when we consider the prospect of extending this approach as a method for scientific
study of all of human (or animal) behavior. In order to do this we must consider the
informational demands on describing human response to all possible conditions that affect
human behavior. While we do not have a complete characterization of what affects human
behavior, we can consider the example of a human being reading and responding to written
statements. A single sentence of a multiple-sentence written statement contains almost 200
letters and an information per letter of approximately 1 bit [6, 19]. We conclude that IC ,
the amount of information in a written statement that a person responds to, can be greater
than 200 bits and the result is that the amount of information in the description given by
Eq. (1) is greater than 2200 = 1060 which is roughly the number of atoms in 1,000 suns
[6, 19]. It is therefore reasonable to state that a project using phenomenological approaches
to characterize human response to written communications would be impractical.
The problem has to do with the scaling of the methodology as the demands increase.
For a few cases, as in Pavlov’s experiment, the method can be effective. However, as the
desire arises to provide a better description that takes into consideration more possible
factors, allowing for more diverse conditions, the amount of effort increases. This increase
scales exponentially so that as the effort to understand system response to the environment
increases, the methodology becomes rapidly impractical.
Consider medical double blind experiments, the standard for determining treatment pro-
tocols for disease conditions and FDA approval of medications [10]. This paradigm directly
maps onto our framework. In this methodology, a population that has a specific condition
is identified. The population is separated into subsets, each of which receives a certain
treatment or no treatment, and the outcomes are measured at a specified time later. In the
simplest case there are two groups, a treated and untreated group, and the measure has
only two possibilities, cured or not, which are definite outcomes. The information needed
to specify the environment consists of a single bit, {0, 1} = {untreated, treated}, and the
observation consists of a single bit, {0, 1} = {cured, notcured}. The amount of information
necessary to specify the result in this case from Eq. (1) is two bits of information, i.e.
which of the outcomes occurs for each of the two conditions. Such experiments serve as
a core of medical knowledge. Our concern here is how this approach generalizes to more
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complex cases. In more complex cases there are both a larger set of conditions and a larger
set of outcomes that are measured. Among the factors that increase the number of condi-
tions are different conditions associated with the diseases (i.e. severity), but also additional
characteristics such as gender, age cohort, co-occurring conditions such as pregnancy, other
diseases (such as heart conditions when treating for depression [20]), drug interactions, etc.
Among the larger set of outcomes are, for example, probabilities of survival, relief of certain
specified symptoms, and probabilities of side effects. Adding cases to the outcomes is not as
problematic as adding more possibilities to the set of conditions. As can be seen from Eq.
(1) we must have a distinct observation for each of the conditions that is to be observed,
i.e. there is need for one independent population for each of the conditions to be tested, a
population which is then also large enough to represent the possible outcomes at the level
of precision desired.
Such an approach cannot accommodate more than a few intrinsic conditions or the large
number of conditions for possible drug interactions. The limitations of this approach from
a mathematical perspective are manifest in difficulties that have been experienced over the
past two decades in the conflict between adequate testing of medications in the face of
cautions about side effects and low probability adverse outcomes, and the need to bring new
medications to use [20–22].
Consider how the same principle appears in engineering, which in principle is an inversely
related process. The idea of engineering is to design and build a system that performs a
particular pre-specified set of responses. In a standard sequence of events, the set of responses
is decided upon, a design is constructed, it is implemented in hardware or software, and the
result is then implemented for use. However there is a step before use that consists of
testing. What is the framework for the testing? When the system is tested we have an
intended functional description, and we have the system. What remains is to compare
them. The difficulty is that we need to perform observations of the response in order to
test them. Thus testing has a similar constraint to strict empirical scientific methods—we
are not allowed to look inside the system in order to evaluate its ability to perform the
behavior; we want to see it perform the behavior. How many bits of information must we
collect in order to test it? This is specified by Eq. (1) — for each condition we must evaluate
its behavior and see if that behavior matches the desired one. Our theorem predicts that
when there are sufficiently many bits of information necessary to describe the conditions,
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the testing process becomes impractical.
We can evaluate this for the case of computer chip design. A computer chip is specified in
terms of an algorithm that relates input pins to output pins. The pins are subject to voltages
that can be considered as binary, either ON or OFF. The number of input pins represents
the amount of environmental information, and the number of output pins represents the
amount of behavioral response of the system identified as the computer chip. The problem
of testing is then to match a given description of the input-output mapping of the computer
chip to the actual performance of that chip. According to our fundamental principle, this
process requires IA2
IC tests, and even if some assumptions are made, it surely should not
be possible to adequately test a chip that has more than 200 bits of input information due
to the huge number of potential tests.
This prediction can be compared to the experience with actual chip design. The problems
with “bugs” in chips after extensive testing originally became a prominent issue during the
1990s when multiple Intel processor chips appeared with errors [23–25]. The number of pins
in the Intel Socket 4 for pentium processors is 273 (Socket 3 is 237 pins). That an error
occurred despite the recognized need for testing demonstrates an inherent difficulty. This
problem was overcome by design for testability—making multiple modules each of which
has fewer pins and can be tested and the joining of multiple components is itself testable
[26]. While computer chips can be readily modularized for testability, this solution is not
readily applied to all systems. The failure rate of complex engineered systems has been
very high in recent years. Methods to address this problem apply evolutionary trial and
error testing [16, 27, 28]. The irony of modern day approaches to engineering of biological
systems, including GMOs, is that it is regressive in using the more traditional engineering
strategy that does not recognize the associated risks [17].
We can apply this discussion to the role of databases in the study of complex biological
or social systems today. A proliferation of phenomenological databases is occurring with
hundreds of gigabytes or terabytes of information about measurements about systems, such
as high throughput data in biology or “big data” in society. We can see that our analysis
formalizes the question: How much data must be obtained to provide the desired information
about a system? Our analysis shows that for a complex system, the amount of data is
exponentially large in the amount of information describing the conditions, and linear in the
amount of information describing actions. We can use this lower bound estimate to evaluate
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whether a strictly data oriented approach is practical for a given system.
In each of these circumstances, we find that the approach can be summarized in the
following way. There is a system, S, which is being observed. There are a set of conditions
that are being applied to the system, and a set of possible outcomes of interest. To char-
acterize this situation in general, we do not need to identify the specific nature of each of
the conditions—what is important is the number of these environmental conditions NC and
the number of the possible outcomes or actions of the system NA. The key concept is a
calculation from these of the amount of information necessary to specify the behavior of the
system.
What is the alternative to the strict phenomenological approach in science? How can
we reduce the amount of information needed? The only way to do so is to characterize the
response of the system to the environments through a concise representation of the system’s
behavior, i.e. a model. In order to represent the behavior of a system in response to a
large set of possible conditions, it is necessary to have a representation of the system that
identifies the response to cases that have not been observed. A model enables inference to
determine the behavior of a system across a range of conditions.
Given the large number of possible observations, observed cases are only a sparse sam-
pling of the cases that are possible. Any individual observation can only serve as a test
of the model rather than in itself be a representation of the system’s response. The more
complex the system is, i.e. the more it can respond to different possible environmental
conditions, the more the interplay of model and testing becomes critical to the scientific
approach. Theoretical approaches are often used in biological and social systems as well as
in physical ones. Our analysis identifies the need for such approaches in contrast to strict
phenomenological ones.
The analysis of our theorem implies that a phenomenological approach is ineffective be-
cause of the large number of observations needed. Models are necessary. However, this
realization does not eliminate the limitations associated with testing. The mathematical
analysis implies that our knowledge is inherently limited by the ability to evaluate only a
few of the large number of conditions of response of a system. That effective empirical strate-
gies are ultimately bound to models implies that both are subject to the same limitations,
and therefore certainty is always bounded. We cannot use strictly empirical approaches
to eliminate the uncertainty associated with modeling extrapolations from existing obser-
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vations to those that we have not done. Modeling is necessary, certainty is not possible.
Limitations of certainty should enter into discussions of risks being taken and estimations of
risk have implications for effective decision making in individual, organizational and social
policy contexts.
An example of a commonly used type of simple model is that the response of the system
to its environments is independent of some aspect of the environment. For example, assume
that the conditions include exposure to a number of different factors. We could assume
that the action of the system only depends on one of them. This would then simplify our
understanding of the response of the system. This type of model is what is commonly used
for strictly empirical studies. Indeed, we can now state that strict empiricism is not and has
never been “model free.” Instead it uses a very limited kind of theory in which the role of
certain factors as the only causes of specific outcomes is assumed rather than tested.
What this means in practical terms is that any laboratory experiment in biology must
use and indeed is using a controlled environment in which to perform the experiment. This
controlling itself limits the study as a method for understanding the behavior of the system.
Similarly, strictly empirical medical or social studies are limited by the applicability of their
choice of restrictions on the conditions that are being evaluated.
Another type of simple model commonly used assumes that intermediate values of con-
ditions have intermediate outcomes according to some metric. Linear, or more generally,
smooth interpolation is a model of system behavior that may or may not be well-justified.
By recognizing explicitly when such simple models are being used, one can question them
and replace them with improved ones as new information is obtained.
The approach of using a more concise model to represent the behavior of a system may
be thought of as a kind of data compression of the information about the system. However,
there is an important distinction between models and compression. If we don’t actually
collect all of the observations about the system (because it is not practical) then it is a
model/theory. If we collect the data but compress it prior to communication then it is a
strictly empirical strategy. Compression reduces the ultimate communication, but doesn’t
reduce the amount of information gathered.
In what way is a model different from a falsifiable hypothesis? A hypothesis is often a
conceptual understanding that provides insight into, i.e. predict, one or more observations.
In order to fulfill the criteria we have established here, a model must provide predictions
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of the results of a large number of observations. In some cases models are used to describe
observations after they have been performed, and are not considered to be applicable beyond
them. Such models do not satisfy our criterion. It is the ability to identify the results of
observations that have not yet been performed that is necessary.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, behaviorism and related phenomenological approaches that do not use in-
ference to determine behavior from more limited information cannot characterize complex
systems. We can define complex systems for these purposes as systems that respond to
many bits of information as described by Eq. (1). In order to describe the behaviors of such
a system, a validated model that generates behaviors from simpler characterizations must
be used.
Thus, it is precisely for highly complex biological and social systems that theoretical
modeling is essential to the scientific process. Existing approaches to biological and so-
cial sciences include theoretical and empirical approaches with various levels of integration
between them. Our analysis discounting the effectiveness of empirical approaches applies
to strict empirical framings of research that command much of the attention of scientists
despite the limitations that we are describing here.
The need for an alternative approach in medicine is increasingly manifest as personal-
ized medications based upon genetic testing are in development [29, 30]. Since there is no
population of individuals on which such treatments can be tested, the inadequacy of tradi-
tional methods is apparent. Nevertheless, current framings of these approaches implicitly
use models whose assumptions are not being acknowledged or validated.
We can strengthen our discussion further, based upon an additional statement that given
an exponentially large set of possible environmental conditions, the chance that any par-
ticular condition will recur more than once is vanishingly small. While this may not be
the case for particular artificial constructs such as computer chips, real world biological and
social systems have levels of detail to their set of conditions that are not measurable. Even
if they are measurable, the fine granularity implies coincidence of two circumstances that
are exactly the same is negligible. With this additional assumption we can state that:
No empirical observation is ever useful as a direct measure of a future observation. It is
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only through generalization motivated by some form of model/theory that we can use past
information to address future circumstances.
Under these conditions theory is necessary not just for a complete description of the be-
havior of a system, but also for the ability to identify the outcome for any new observation,
given a set of prior empirical observations. Why therefore, are strictly empirical approaches
considered to be effective—because they inherently adopt, without testing, simplifying as-
sumptions. Only a few conditions are identified, within each of these conditions changes
in other factors are considered not to be relevant to the outcomes being considered, and
therefore conditions are replicable. It is interesting to point out in this context that medical
journals do not accept models based upon the assumption that they are weaker forms of sci-
entific knowledge than “actual observations.” However, it is the assumptions of replicability,
independence and transferability that are ultimately the weaker assumptions. The current
dominant approach to medical knowledge is limited due to its methodology in adopting the
limitations of empiricism as a weak form of theory. It is only through the assumption that
there are only a few important conditions that the use of past observations can be considered
to be applicable to future ones.
Consider the statement that “all theories/models are false [31].” While this is a reasonable
statement, we see from our discussion that it misses an essential point. Theories are essential;
strictly empirical approaches are largely untested, poorly justified, theories. So it should be
understood that not just all theories that are false—all expectations about future events
are in the same sense unreliable (i.e. false), since only in idealized simple systems can
conditions be replicated. For complex systems all empirical inferences are just as false,
indeed they are actually more limited than theories by their assumptions of replicability
of conditions, independence of different causal factors, and transfer to different conditions
of prior observations. Thus we cannot rely upon their validity. The approach that is more
effective is to develop better models that can identify outcomes of a wide range of conditions,
and empirically test them as much as possible.
The importance of theory does not mean that there is a diminished importance of data.
Indeed, for complex systems it is not possible to have enough data to fully describe the
system. This means that we have to use the data we do have as effectively as possible. An
important way to understand the role of theory is that it makes data more useful. By using
data to test the theory, it can be generalized to conditions that have not yet been observed.
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The advent of “big data” is critical for addressing complex systems, but without recognizing
the sparseness of that data in an exponentially rich possible data set we are limited in the
progress we can make. Observations should be designed (when possible) to optimally sample
the space of possibilities so that the best theoretical inferences can be obtained about all
conditions not just the ones that have been seen. Controlled experiments may be particularly
useful because they enable more optimal testing of theories. Data collected without controls
provides an alternative and increasingly important source of information relevant to testing
of theories, but where optimization may not be possible.
Given the severe limitations that we have identified of strictly empirical approaches we
should ask why have we been able to make as much progress as we have until now? The
human ability to create mental models provides an explanation. This model-making capa-
bility and the resulting “intuition” has been a large part of our advances rather than the
more limited empirical strategies as well as the limited mathematical apparatus of calculus
and statistics. While traditional mathematical theories have been confined to the assump-
tions of calculus and statistics, human model-making is not, and neither are new theoretical
methods [14].
Recognizing that real world conditions cannot be replicated, our ability to identify im-
portant factors that influence outcomes is essential. Ultimately, the possibility of knowledge
itself must rely upon the ability to differentiate between different pieces of information based
on their importance. Observations must focus on those pieces of information and not on the
rest. Without such an ability, the listing of always irrelevant facts is unavoidable. Thus it
is evident that an essential role of theory must be to identify which pieces of information
are important. We must therefore ask whether we have tools to do the former, a discussion
of which is the subject of a separate article [32]. It is key to understand how and for what
questions it is possible to overcome the limitations we have identified. Prior to this discus-
sion, it is reasonable to suggest that in the future we should both use the best theoretical
tools and make the most use of our “intuition” (i.e. mental models) as model-making sys-
tems. Practical approaches to medicine, management and policy require a better framing of
how we can effectively understand biological and social systems. Recognizing that empirical
approaches do not extend well to complex systems, and that theory and experiment must
work hand in hand is an important step in the right direction.
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V. APPENDIX
For reference, we include separately here the central theorem and two corollaries.
Fundamental theorem of complex systems: Behavioral complexity
Given a system whose behavior we want to specify, for which the conditions as input
variables have a complexity of IC , and the actions of the system have a complexity of IA,
then the complexity of specification of the behavior of the system is:
IS = 2
ICIA (2)
Where complexity is defined as the logarithm (base 2) of the number of possibilities or,
equivalently, the length of a description in bits. The proof follows from recognizing that a
complete specification of the behavior is given by a table whose rows are the actions (IA bits)
for each possible input, of which there are 2IC . Since no restriction has been assumed on the
actions, all actions are possible and this is the minimal length description of the function.
Note that this theorem applies to the complexity of description as defined by the observer,
so that each of the quantities can be defined by the desires of the observer for descriptive
accuracy.
Corollary: A complex system’s responses are not independent
According to physics, the amount of information necessary to describe completely a hu-
man being is no more than the entropy of a corresponding equilibrium system, with the same
matter, volume and temperature, measured in bits. We can compare the entropy of a human
being in bits with Eq (1) for human response to the text of a sentence. The entropy can
be estimated to be 1031 [14], which is much smaller than 1060. Thus, we can conclude that
the information necessary to describe the quantum limited amount of information about a
system would be more concise a description than a purely empirical behavioral one. Since,
according to physics, the entropy is the maximum available information about a system, the
responses of a system must be describable using a more concise description than Eq. (1).
Equivalently, we can say that the responses of the system are not independent of each other.
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This corollary does not provide us with the amount of information needed for a model,
only that there exists models that require much less information than a strictly empirical
approach.
Corollary: Strictly empirical approaches (Behaviorism and Medical testing) are not
practical for complex systems
Since behaviorism and medical testing approaches self-impose the conditions of the the-
orem, the information needed to pursue them grows exponentially, and they are therefore
impractical for all but the most limited sets of conditions.
Technical note on the dynamics of progressive analysis
In our analysis there is an a-priori assumed set of conditions and actions that are being
studied. This framing is convenient for analysis. In the real world identifying the conditions
and actions is part of the scientific process. While this creates a cyclical situation that is
problematic for logic, it is overcome, like many other paradoxes in logic, by allowing for
a dynamical process. Specifically we assume a progression of stages indexed by τ such
that IC(τ) and IA(τ) are the τth scientific stages of inquiry. The first stage can be done
arbitrarily.
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